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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

COGNITIVE DISSONANCE IN THE CLASSROOM: RATIONALE
AND RATIONALIZATION IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

JULIE A. SEAMAN*
“[The] theory of cognitive dissonance posits that when a person’s actions and
attitudes are discrepant, physiological arousal results, leading to
psychological discomfort, which in turn motivates the person to restore
harmony between his or her attitudes and behavior by altering the attitudes to
fit the behavior.”1

I. INTRODUCTION
In perhaps the single most famous quotation about the law, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. remarked that “the life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience.”2 Though not written especially about the law of evidence, the
words have a particular salience when considered in that context. By their
very nature, rules of evidence operate at the place where logic and experience
meet and sometimes clash; in the messy crucible of the courtroom, where the
rules must function to meet a number of sometimes conflicting goals, logic
often gives way in the face of experience. In the courtroom this is a necessary
and probably a salutary state of affairs. In the classroom, however, it becomes
a challenge. Perhaps unlike most other law classes, the Evidence course
presents the professor with the odd task of explaining a set of rules for which
many of the proffered rationales are not merely questionable but selfconsciously so. The cases, the Advisory Committee’s Notes, and experts in the
field frequently send mixed messages that are likely to create cognitive
dissonance in the classroom. For what else can be the effect on students of
teaching them a set of rules for which many of the stated rationales are quite
obviously—indeed often explicitly—rationalizations?

* Assistant Professor, Emory University School of Law. For thoughtful comments on an earlier
draft, I am grateful to Martha Grace Duncan, Steve Cook, Howard Abrams, Kay Levine, Michael
Kang, Ani Satz, Michael Perry, and Joanna Shepherd.
1. Matthew D. Lieberman et al., Do Amnesiacs Exhibit Cognitive Dissonance Reduction?
The Role of Explicit Memory and Attention in Attitude Change, 12 PSYCH. SCI. 135, 135 (2001).
See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
2. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1963).
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A remark by noted judge, scholar, and sometime Evidence professor
Richard Posner, in an opinion discussing one of the many exceptions3 to the
rule against hearsay, starkly illustrates this phenomenon. Examining the basis
for the hearsay exception for admissions of co-conspirators4 in an appeal
before the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner noted that “the rationalization for the
principle is that conspirators are each others’ agents (and therefore principals),
and the principal is bound by the agent’s words and deeds . . . so that an
admission by one is an admission by all . . . .”5 The opinion goes on to
question this analogy to agency principles and to raise serious doubts about the
basis, either in reliability or waiver, of this exception. The discussion ends by
noting that “[w]hatever the justification for the rule—and there may be none—
its dependence on agency principles makes the scope of the conspiracy
critical.”6 In sum, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals here says that a rule of
evidence grounded upon a very questionable logical foundation should
nonetheless be applied consistent with that probably faulty logic.7
When “rationalization” substitutes for “rationale” in a judicial opinion
explaining the reasons for a rule of evidence, it must give one pause. First, one
wonders whether a Freudian slip8 caused the Seventh Circuit to inject in this
way its assessment of the basis for the co-conspirator exception. Second,
taking the statement on its face, it is rather extraordinary for a federal circuit
court of appeals this candidly to acknowledge that the rule it is applying is
based on so shaky a foundation.9 And, finally, one must wonder about the

3. The distinction, in the Federal Rules of Evidence, between the exceptions set out in
Rules 803 and 804 and the definitional “non-hearsay” categories contained in Rule 801(d) is
another example of the phenomenon to which this Essay is addressed; however, for ease of
reference I will use the term “exception” for all 801(d), 803, and 804 categories.
4. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) (“A statement is not hearsay if—. . . (2) Admission by
party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is . . . (E) a statement by a
coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”).
5. United States v. DiDomenico, 78 F.3d 294, 303 (7th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
6. Id.
7. I do not mean to suggest that this is necessarily wrong (either doctrinally, normatively,
or as a matter of institutional separation of function), but only that it comes across as exceedingly
cynical.
8. See SIGMOND FREUD, THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE 53–105 (“Slips of
the Tongue”), 116–33 (“Slips of the Pen”) (1965). Based on the context and the tenor of the
discussion in the opinion, a good case could be made that this word was carefully chosen rather
than accidentally used.
9. Inferior courts have been known not infrequently to decide a case while saying
something like: “We are bound by precedent/higher authority to apply this misguided rule though
we believe the rule or its rationale is wrong.” See, e.g., Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co.,
769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985); cf. LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 28–30 (1986)
(discussing rhetoric of judicial opinions in the Skokie Nazi march case in which the judges make
clear that they personally abhor the Nazi speech at issue, and “intimate that they would arrive at a
very different resolution if they were deciding the case on a clean slate, but that such a resolution
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effect that such a forthcoming assessment has upon the students who, by
reading this decision and others, learn the law of evidence. And the Posner
example is only one of many that occur throughout the Evidence course.10
What is the effect of teaching students rules whose stated rationales are plainly,
and often admittedly, very questionable at best and simply unsupportable at
worst?
Social psychology teaches that when logic and experience—belief and
behavior—conflict, the result is an uncomfortable psychological state known
as cognitive dissonance. According to the classic explication of the theory,
such dissonance results in the person’s attempting to decrease the dissonance
and bring belief and behavior (or any two dissonant cognitions) into
consonance.11 Consonance may be attained through a variety of means.12 One
method—the one that has received the most attention in the psychological
literature and on which I focus here—is attitude change. In short, the person
alters her attitudes to fit her behavior and thus to attain consonance.13 The

was foreclosed by standing precedents of a higher court, the Supreme Court”). An interesting
aspect of the discussion in DiDomenico is that it does not take this approach. Though critical of
the logic behind the justification for the rule, the court seems to embrace the rule itself (or at least
whether it does so is ambiguous).
10. See infra Part II.
11. See generally FESTINGER, supra note 1. Many studies of attitude change use what is
known as the “free-choice paradigm.” In the original study using this paradigm, women were
asked to rate a series of household appliances for desirability. They were then given a choice
between two of the appliances that they had rated very similarly to take home as compensation
for participating in the study. Following their choice, they were again asked to rate the group of
appliances. In the post-choice rating, they rated the chosen appliance as more desirable than they
had originally done, and the non-chosen appliance as less desirable. This phenomenon is known
as spreading the alternatives. It is consistent with dissonance theory because the person, having
made a choice (the behavior), attempts to reduce the dissonance between the behavior and the
belief (that the two alternatives were similarly desirable) by altering the beliefs to be more in line
with the behavior.
12. These include bolstering (acquiring or focusing upon items of information that are
consonant with the chosen behavior), trivialization (reducing the importance of items of
information that are dissonant with the behavior), and self-affirmation (reminding oneself of
one’s positive values and attributes). See Patricia Devine et al., Moving Beyond Attitude Change
in the Study of Dissonance-Related Processes, in COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: PROGRESS ON A
PIVOTAL THEORY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 302 (Eddie Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills eds.,
1999) [hereinafter PROGRESS ON A PIVOTAL THEORY]; Joel Cooper, Unwanted Consequences
and the Self: In Search of the Motivation for Dissonance Reduction, in PROGRESS ON A PIVOTAL
THEORY, supra, at 156–57; DOUGLAS H. LAWRENCE & LEON FESTINGER, DETERRENTS AND
REINFORCEMENT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INSUFFICIENT REWARD 46–47 (1962).
13. The other major theory of attitude change is self-perception theory, according to which
“people infer their own attitudes the same way they infer the attitudes of others, namely, by
observing their own behavior.” Lieberman et al., supra note 1, at 135; see D.J. Bem, An
Experimental Analysis of Self-Persuasion, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCH. 199 (1965). In
other words, rather than employing motivated reasoning to reduce the uncomfortable feeling of
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study of attitude change assumes that this process is conscious and reflective—
that it is a process of “rationalization.”14 In this Essay, I wish to use the theory
of cognitive dissonance on two levels: first, as a metaphor to describe and
understand the process that has helped to mold the law of evidence, and
second, to explore the psychological effect on students of being taught legal
rules that often—and sometimes self-consciously—rest on faulty logic. My
conclusion mirrors in some respects the revolution that is now underway in the
fields of cognitive and social psychology and brain science: by rediscovering
the crucial role of intuition and affect in human decision-making,15 Evidence
students may actually be poised to benefit from the cognitive dissonance
induced in them by the uncomfortable rationalizations that exist in the rules.
This Essay first lays out the descriptive case for the proposition that the
Evidence course is rife with rules whose stated rationales look more like
rationalizations.16 In particular, I point out those areas in which the Advisory
Committee’s Notes, cases, and/or academic commentary expressly recognize
that the traditional justifications for a particular rule are difficult to support
based upon the current state of psychological and sociological knowledge.17
Next, I identify the predicted effect on students of this peculiar feature of the
Evidence course, and in particular discuss the cognitive dissonance that may be
induced by the juxtaposition of the rules and their “rationalizations.” Finally, I

dissonance caused by the discrepancy between belief and behavior as posited by Festinger’s
theory of cognitive dissonance, persons alter their beliefs in response to their behaviors because
the belief is secondary to the behavior and results from the person’s observation of the behavior.
As explained infra, recent research casts doubt on some of the premises of both of these theories
of attitude change. See Lieberman et al., supra note 1; Matthew D. Lieberman et al., EvidenceBased and Intuition-Based Self-Knowledge: An fMRI Study, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH.
421 (2004).
14. See Lieberman et al., supra note 1, at 138 (noting that “[c]onscious attention to the
counterattitudinal behavior and conscious work in the service of attitude revision are both
unspecified, but implied, components of cognitive dissonance theory”).
15. See Lieberman et al., supra note 1; Michael S. Gazzaniga & Megan S. Steven, Free Will
in the Twenty-first Century (summarizing studies which suggest that much decision-making
occurs before the individual has any conscious awareness of making the decision), in
NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW 55–59 (Brent Garland ed. 2004). For a popular and engaging
account of the new research on the role of intuition in decision-making, see MALCOLM
GLADWELL, BLINK (2005).
16. I recognize that this is not a revolutionary or shocking observation. I don’t claim any
originality in noticing that many of the stated reasons for the evidence rules are of questionable
validity. I don’t even claim originality in noticing that they are expressly so. My contribution, if
any, is in exploring how this feature of the rules affects students and impacts teaching.
17. I refer here not to genuine debates over the wisdom of a particular rule; my concern is
rather with those treatments that say, in effect, “Everyone knows that this (stated, historical,
conventional) rationale is unsupportable based on current knowledge (if, indeed, it ever was
supportable in light of the state of knowledge at the time it developed).”
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offer some tentative conclusions and suggestions for a productive and
constructive approach to this challenging aspect of teaching Evidence.
II. RULES, RATIONALES & RATIONALIZATIONS
The Federal Rules of Evidence are the product of a lengthy and ongoing
process of common law development, drafting, comment, enactment, and
amendment that has drawn on the knowledge, experience, and
recommendations of a wide range of experts in the field.18 I note this in order
to make the obvious point that the Federal Rules are decidedly not arbitrary.
They were deliberately crafted, one would hope and imagine, for good reasons.
They continue to be reviewed and amended by a process that includes
distinguished judges and other experts in the field.19 That is not to say that
everyone need agree that a certain incarnation of a rule is the best choice;
neither is it to deny the compromises and defects inherent in any process that
includes drafting by committee. It is only to suggest that the Federal Rules are,
presumably, normatively and factually supportable in their current form based
upon some reasonable set of assumptions20 and policy goals.21 That they are,
18. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 3–6 (3d ed.
2003) (noting that the Federal Rules of Evidence “were proposed by a distinguished Advisory
Committee comprised of practitioners, judges, and law professors appointed by the United States
Supreme Court,” which “labored for more than eight years, producing two published drafts that
were publicized among bench and bar and a would-be final version that the Supreme Court
accepted and transmitted to Congress”).
19. The Supreme Court’s Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules is charged with
recommending amendments to the rules.
See U.S. Courts, Federal Rulemaking,
http://host3.uscourts.gov/rules/proceduresum.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
20. I refer here primarily to assumptions about human behavior and psychology. The rules
are, for the most part, grounded upon assumptions about the behavior and psychology of
witnesses (whether out-of-court declarants or in-court testifying witnesses) and of jurors. Based
upon these empirical assumptions, the rules are then crafted to serve various goals in light of
these behavioral constraints. Cf. Owen Jones, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
405, 415–16 (2005) (“[L]aw is a lever for moving behavior that has a model of human behavior
as its fulcrum. That fulcrum consists of what we think we know about how and why people
behave as they do, and it therefore incorporates the aggregated insights that underlie our
prediction that if law moves this way behavior will move that way, and not some other way.
Consequently, law can generally obtain no more leverage on human behaviors it seeks to change
than the accuracy of its behavioral model allows.”).
21. Indeed, these goals are set out in the rules themselves. Rule 102 provides that the
overarching normative goals of the Federal Rules of Evidence are “fairness in administration,
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay,” the ascertainment of “truth,” and that
proceedings may be “justly determined.” FED. R. EVID. 102. Based on the language and
structure of Rule 102, it seems that the first two (fairness and minimization of cost and delay) are
normative goals regarding the application of the Federal Rules, while the latter two (truth and
justice) are the normative goals underlying the content of the Federal Rules themselves. For a
concise summary of the commonly cited reasons for evidence law in general (as opposed to the
reasons for these particular rules), see MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 18, at 2–3.
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one would hope, supported by rationales22 rather than rationalizations.23 And
yet . . .
One is hard-pressed to find much evidence of these empirically
supportable behavioral and psychological assumptions within the stated
rationales for many of the rules. In fact, one often finds instead a candid
admission that the assumption is a fiction. These are not “legal fictions”24 in
the usual sense of that term, but fictions of a different sort: few really think, for
example, that people are especially likely to be truthful when they believe that
they are at death’s door, and yet that rationale survives as the basis for the
dying declaration exception.25 This phenomenon is pervasive throughout the

22. The RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1119 (1996) defines
“rationale” as “the fundamental reason or reasons serving to account for something.”
23. The primary definition of “rationalization” in the RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S
COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1119 (1996) is “[ascribing] (one’s actions) to causes that seem reasonable
but do not reflect the true, unconscious, or less creditable causes.” In psychology,
“rationalization” refers to the “process of justification for the choice after its completion to satisfy
oneself rather than of affording logical presentation of reasons to influence the process
beforehand.” FESTINGER, supra note 1, at 73–74 (quoting Martin, A.H., An Experimental Study
of the Factors and Types of Voluntary Choice, 51 ARCHIVES OF PSYCHOLOGY 40–41 (1922)).
24. A “legal fiction” is an “[a]ssumption of fact made by [a] court as [the] basis for deciding
a legal question,” or “[a] situation contrived by the law to permit a court to dispose of a matter,
though it need not be created improperly.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 804 (5th ed. 1979); see
also LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 9 (1967) (“A fiction is either (1) a statement propounded
with a complete or partial consciousness of its falsity, or (2) a false statement recognized as
having utility . . . .”). This should not be confused with “legal fiction.” See, e.g., JOHN GRISHAM,
THE FIRM (1992).
Legal fictions, as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary and as explored by Fuller in his
excellent book, are not distinguishable from rationalizations on the basis that they are admittedly
false. Indeed, as can be seen in his definition above, this is the very characteristic that makes a
legal rule a “fiction” in Fuller’s view. Rather, the distinction turns on the role of the fiction in the
legal framework. A legal fiction is a known falsity within the legal rule—for example, the fiction
that a husband and wife are “one person,” or that recording a deed provides “constructive
notice”—such that the legal consequences that accompany personhood, or notice, are deemed to
apply. The legal fiction, then, is part and parcel of the rule.
The fiction that turns a rationale into a rationalization, in contrast, is not a part of the rule
per se. Rather, it is the legal or factual justification for the rule. In the case of the hearsay
exceptions, for example, the legal justification for allowing exceptions as a general matter is that
there is something about the circumstances under which particular classes of statements are made
that tends to make them sufficiently reliable so as to justify dispensing with the usual
requirements of oath, cross-examination, and demeanor. Each exception, then, turns upon a story
about why this class of statements is reliable. And because reliability is essentially a statement
about the human tendency to be truthful and accurate, the justification for each exception
generally rests upon factual statements or assumptions about human nature, psychology,
motivation, and capacity.
25. See
Richard
Friedman,
The
Confrontation
Blog,
available
at
http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2004/12/forfeiture-and-dying-declarations.html
(last
visited Feb. 21, 2006).
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rules of evidence.26 There are rules and there are rationales, but in a significant
number of instances those rationales look a lot like rationalizations.
Many of the most obvious instances of reasons that seem to come with a
wink and a nod are contained in Article VIII, the rules governing admissibility
of hearsay. Under Rule 802, hearsay is generally not admissible unless it falls
under one of the exceptions provided in Rules 803 and 804, or under the
definitional exclusions contained in Rule 801(d).27 Unless all hearsay is to be
admitted (or all excluded),28 there must be some basis for separating
admissible hearsay from inadmissible hearsay. Because the Federal Rules, as
well as the evidence rules of all of the states, retain the basic rule against
hearsay, the categorical exceptions must rest on some rational (or seemingly
rational) basis. In general, that reasoned basis consists in the assumption that
certain classes of statements are inherently more reliable than others. Their
reliability flows from the circumstances under which the statements are made.
It necessarily rests upon certain ideas and assumptions about the conditions
under which human beings—the people making the statements—are likely to
be truthful and accurate.29 When those assumptions are demonstrably—or
even probably—wrong, then the rule rests on a rationalization rather than a
rationale.30

26. This Essay, like most Evidence casebooks, focuses on the Federal Rules of Evidence.
27. See FED. R. EVID. 802 (“Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or
by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of
Congress.”); FED. R. EVID. 803 (exceptions for which availability of the declarant is immaterial);
FED. R. EVID. 804 (exceptions requiring that declarant be unavailable); FED. R. EVID. 801(d)
(definitional non-hearsay).
28. The first alternative has often been proposed, most notably by Jeremy Bentham. See
JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 1 (1827); see also Roger Park, A Subject
Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51, 52 (1987) (noting that twentieth
century legal scholars “have tended to be supporters of simplification or abolition” of the rule
against hearsay); MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, 2 HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801.0, at 188
(1996); Paul S. Milich, Hearsay Antinomies: The Case for Abolishing the Rule and Starting Over,
71 OR. L. REV. 723 (1992); Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 95, 111 (1996).
29. It would also be rational for hearsay exceptions to rest on an alternative basis: a claim
that fact-finders could more reliably evaluate out-of-court statements made under certain
circumstances as opposed to others. However, to my knowledge there are no hearsay exceptions
that rest on such arguments.
30. A rationalization need not necessarily be logically unsupportable; it is possible that a
stated reason could be logically unassailable and yet that it still be a post hoc basis for an action
taken for other reasons or for no good reason. However, when the reason is logically
unsupportable, that is good evidence that it is a rationalization rather than a rationale. It would be
much more difficult—and therefore beyond the scope of this Essay—to uncover rationalizations
where those reasons actually provide logical support for the rule.
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The excited utterance exception is a prime example of a rule that rests
upon a questionable rationale.31 Under the evidence rules, a hearsay statement
is admissible where the declarant makes the statement while under the stress of
an exciting event, and where the statement relates to the exciting event.32
According to the classic and oft-cited rationale articulated by Wigmore, such
statements tend to be truthful because the exciting event “stills the reflective
faculties and removes their control, so that the utterance which then occurs is a
spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions
already produced by the external shock.”33
As long ago as the 1920s, experimental psychology called into question the
stated bases for this exception.34 A law review article discussing then-current
advances in the field noted that, of Wigmore’s two requirements of speed and
high emotion, neither had empirical support as a likely guide to truthfulness
and accuracy in the courtroom.35 As for speed, the authors conceded that
deception generally does require more time than truthfulness; however, though
that time difference was statistically significant in the laboratory, it was so
small as to be meaningless to a judge ruling on a hearsay objection.36 And
with respect to the influence of emotional disturbance, the authors noted that
“[o]ne need not be a psychologist to distrust an observation made under
emotional stress; everybody accepts such statements with mental
reservation.”37

31. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (“A statement relating to a startling event or condition made
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.”).
32. See id.
33. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 6 EVIDENCE § 1747 (3d ed. 1940). Wigmore’s conception of
the psychology underlying speakers’ statements reflects a sharp divide between rational
(reflective) and emotional or sensory (reflexive) processes. Elaborating on the reliability of
spontaneous declarations, he says that because they are “made under the immediate and
uncontrolled domination of the senses, and during the brief period when considerations of selfinterest could not have been brought fully to bear by reasoned reflection, the utterance may be
taken as particularly trustworthy (or, at least, as lacking the usual grounds of untrustworthiness),
and thus as expressing the real tenor of the speaker’s belief as to the facts just observed by
him . . . .” Id.
34. See Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of
Evidence, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 432 (1928).
35. Id.
36. See id. at 436–37 (“[T]he difference in time between the ordinary reaction and the
deception reaction . . . is so slight, from .83 seconds to 3 ½ minutes, that it cannot be measured
without the aid of instruments. The sound discretion of the trial judge, with the best of intention
in these cases, is likely to be fallible.”); I. Daniel Stewart, Jr., Perception, Memory, and Hearsay:
A Criticism of Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1,
28 n.126.
37. Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 34, at 437 (discussing psychological experiments as
well as “stories from real life” demonstrating the tendency of emotion to distort accurate
reporting of events); see also I. Daniel Stewart, Jr., supra note 36.
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More recently, the Seventh Circuit, denying a petition for habeas corpus
based upon a Confrontation Clause challenge to the admission of an excited
utterance hearsay statement,38 questioned the traditional justification for the
exception on two grounds. After noting that the “thinking behind [the
exception] is that lying is deliberate, and a person who is under stress induced
by a startling occurrence cannot deliberate; so the fact that the statement he
blurted out in these circumstances was not made under oath does not detract
substantially from its truthfulness,” the court questioned whether this rationale
might “give too much weight to the oath, whose terrors have diminished in this
secular age.”39 In addition, the court stated that the rationale “ignores the
possibility that stress may induce inaccurate, even if sincere, utterances.”40
Despite these reservations, most commentators agree that the exception
should be retained. The Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 803(2) states that
“while the theory of Exception (2) has been criticized on the ground that
excitement impairs accuracy of observation as well as eliminating conscious
fabrication . . . it finds support in cases without number.”41 Hutchins and
Slesinger suggest that their review of the psychological literature might argue
for a rule that states: “Hearsay is inadmissible, especially (not except) if it be a
spontaneous exclamation.”42 They go on, however, to say that “[o]f course,
such a result would be preposterous.”43 In sum, though many sources
recognize the shaky foundation upon which this exception purportedly sits,
they nonetheless reaffirm its place in the hearsay scheme. And cases and
commentators continue to expound the (questionable) rationale for the
exception.
As with the exception for excited utterances, the justifications for the dying
declaration exception44 often sound more in rationalization than rationale. The

38. The Confrontation Clause claim was premised upon the unreliability of the statement.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Though the constitutional analysis is obviously superseded by the
Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), its
discussion of the reliability of statements made under the stress of an exciting event remains
instructive.
39. Ferrier v. Duckworth, 902 F.2d 545, 548 (7th Cir. 1990). This point would seem to
apply to all of the hearsay exceptions, not only to excited utterances.
40. Id. The court denied the petition on the ground that “[t]he confrontation clause is not a
proper vehicle for revolutionizing the law of evidence.” Id.
41. FED. R. EVID. 803(2) Advisory Committee’s Note (citations omitted). It is difficult to
know what to make of such statements (and there are others) in the Advisory Committee’s Notes.
They suggest that adoption of the rule in question is more a restatement than a reasoned choice.
On the other hand, as I argue infra at text accompanying notes 71–72, experience may be a
perfectly valid basis for retaining rules for which logical rationales are elusive.
42. Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 35, at 439.
43. Id.
44. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2). The rule provides an exception in homicide and civil cases
where the declarant is unavailable and the statement was “made by a declarant while believing
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exception ostensibly rests on the idea that a person who believes that her death
is imminent will be unlikely to lie about the circumstances of her impending
death.45 The Advisory Committee and the House Committee on the Judiciary
both expressed some doubt as to the traditional justification for the exception,46
but the rule expanded the exception beyond its common law boundaries
nonetheless.47 As Professor Lilly has pointed out, it is difficult to square the
contours of the exception with its stated rationale.48
It has long been recognized that where an exception (such as this one) is
grounded in certain beliefs about human psychology, it might be well to
investigate—to the extent possible—whether those beliefs are accurate.49
Their accuracy is at least debatable in the case of dying declarations, as noted
by numerous sources.50 For example, Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick, in a
hornbook consulted by countless Evidence students, state that
[w]hether it makes sense to suppose awareness of impending death leads one
to be truthful in comments about cause or circumstances may be debated.
Some lines in Shakespeare argue that the dying have no need to do mischief by
deception and hesitate to deceive before meeting God, but Balzac painted a

that the declarant’s death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the
declarant believed to be impending death.” Id.
45. As noted supra at note 25 and accompanying text, Professor Richard Friedman has
argued that the true, or better, reason for the exception is grounded in the doctrine of forfeiture.
Traditional rationales also recognize that this exception in particular rests in large part upon
necessity. See United States v. Thevis, 84 F.R.D. 57, 63 (1979); infra note 51 and accompanying
text.
46. The Advisory Committee’s Note states that “the original religious justification for the
exception may have lost its conviction for some persons over the years . . . .” See FED. R. EVID.
804(b)(2) (originally submitted as 804(b)(3)) Advisory Committee’s Note). The House
Committee Report states that “[t]he Committee did not consider dying declarations as among the
most reliable forms of hearsay,” and that it therefore “amended the provision to limit their
admissibility in criminal cases to homicide prosecutions, where exceptional need for the evidence
is present.” See H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 7089 (1973) (Report of House Committee on the
Judiciary, FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) (originally submitted as 804(b)(3))).
47. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) expanded the exception to civil cases.
48. See GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 333–35 (3d ed.
1996).
49. See JON R. WALTZ & ROGER C. PARK, EVIDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 138 (10th ed.
2004) (quoting CAIRNS, LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 173–74 (1935)) (“Psychology may or
may not confirm the law’s assumption but at least it would be wise for the courts to inquire what
it has to offer.”); see also LILLY, supra note 48, at 334 (noting that if the psychological
assumptions upon which the exception is based are faulty, then the statements should not be
admitted in homicide prosecutions, and if these assumptions are valid, then the statements should
be admitted in a wide variety of cases rather than limited to homicide and civil cases).
50. See, e.g., Stanley A. Goldman, Not So ‘Firmly Rooted’: Exceptions to the Confrontation
Clause, 66 N.C. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (1987); Leonard Jaffee, The Constitution and Proof by Dead or
Unconfrontable Declarants, 33 ARK. L. REV. 227, 291, 313 (1979).
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picture of a wronged woman vicious even in her dying breath, and both
viewpoints find echoes in decided cases.51

Likewise, courts have questioned the reliability rationale for the exception.
For example, one court, after dutifully reporting the traditional rationale, stated
that “[m]ore realistically, the dying declaration is admitted, because of
compelling need for the statement rather than any inherent trustworthiness.”52
What is curious here is not the admission of the statements; need may well be a
compelling and logical reason for their admission. Rather, it is the sources’
constant and repeated recitation of the reliability rationale as a basis for
admission while at the same time acknowledging that it is perhaps a rather thin
reed upon which to hang a murder conviction.
The extension of the medical treatment exception to statements made for
purposes of diagnosis53 provides a further example of the phenomenon. Under
the common law, statements made to doctors for purposes of treatment were
viewed as reliable based upon the patient’s interest in getting effective medical
treatment.54 The Federal Rules expanded the exception to include statements
made for purposes of diagnosis as well as treatment. The Advisory Committee
and the commentators have recognized that the reliability rationale does not
apply to this latter class of statements. The Advisory Committee’s Note
acknowledges that “[c]onventional doctrine has excluded from the hearsay
exception, as not within its guarantee of truthfulness, statements to a physician
consulted only for the purpose of enabling him to testify.”55 The Committee
explains the elimination of this limitation as related to the operation of the
rules governing expert testimony: Because the expert medical witness will be

51. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE, supra note 18, § 8.71
(citations omitted). It may well be that Shakespeare and Balzac are the best we can do in terms of
analyzing the psychological assumptions that underlie the dying declaration exception. It is
difficult to conceive of an experimental design that would be both ethical and feasible. But see
Goldman, supra note 50, at 24 (stating that “[e]mpirical data from various studies suggests [sic]
that the pressures which favor the reliability of dying declarations may be outweighed by other
factors”). In any event, the fact that the assumptions may ultimately be untestable does not
necessarily mitigate the effect of teaching a rule based on what intuition, cases, and commentators
suggest are highly questionable psychological justifications.
52. United States v. Thevis, 84 F.R.D. 57, 63 (1979).
53. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) (providing an exception for statements “made for purposes of
medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain,
or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar
as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment”).
54. See, e.g., MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 18, § 8.42 (“The main reason to admit
statements made for purposes of getting treatment is that they are trustworthy. . . . [The patient]
knows his description helps determine treatment, so he has reason to speak candidly and
carefully, and risks of insincerity and ambiguity are minimal.”).
55. FED. R. EVID. 803(4) Advisory Committee’s Note.
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permitted to testify to the basis of her opinion under Rule 703,56 juries will
hear the statements in any event and will be unlikely to restrict their
consideration of the evidence to non-truth purposes.57
Though this expansion of the common law rule may more reasonably be
seen as a quirk of the codification and amendment process than as a genuine
instance of rationalization in the face of contrary evidence, it nevertheless
represents a prime example of a rule unsupported—at least after the
amendment to Rule 703—by any rationale whatsoever. Professors Mueller
and Kirkpatrick put it thus: “But it is odd, to say the least, to find in place a
hearsay exception that was broadened on the theory that the statements are
going to come out anyway, then to retain the broadened exception after FRE
702 was amended to cut off the opportunity that was the basis for expanding
the exception in the first place!”58
The above-described rules present perhaps the starkest examples of
rationalization in the law of evidence, but there are others as well. Several of
the definitional hearsay exceptions contained in the admissions doctrine of
Rule 801(d)(2), including the exception for statements of co-conspirators as
noted above,59 rest on very questionable assumptions. In addition to Judge
Posner’s characterization of the justification for the co-conspirator exception as
a “rationalization,” the Advisory Committee’s Notes acknowledge that “the
agency theory of conspiracy is at best a fiction . . . .”60 The scholarly literature
has noted that the decision to exempt admissions from the definition of hearsay
is “justifiable as to direct and authorized admissions but not as to the vicarious
admissions of agents and coconspirators.”61
56. Under the version of Rule 703 that existed at the time that Rule 803(4) was expanded in
this manner, an expert was permitted to testify to the basis of her opinion—including otherwise
inadmissible hearsay—so long as such facts or data were of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field. The rule has since been amended to restrict the disclosure of such
evidence “unless the court determines that [the] probative value [of the otherwise inadmissible
evidence] in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs [the
evidence’s] prejudicial effect.” FED. R. EVID. 703.
57. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) Advisory Committee’s Note.
58. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 18, at 835–36.
59. See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text.
60. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) Advisory Committee Note.
61. Stewart, supra note 36, at 26. A slightly different but related attribute of the Evidence
course, which might be expected to create dissonance in students, concerns a structural feature of
two of its central topics: hearsay and character evidence. In both of these areas, it may be said
that the exceptions threaten to swallow the rule. Students are likely to come away from the study
of character evidence, for example, with the impression that the rules purport to exclude evidence
of character to prove propensity, when in fact much evidence of that nature is admissible for other
reasons. Similarly, they likely come away from studying the rule against hearsay with the
message that the rules claim to exclude hearsay while not actually excluding much hearsay. A
potential message to students reading the cases in these areas is that even if the rules are logical in
theory, they are often arbitrary in application. See, e.g., G. Michael Fenner, Law Professor
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Students are presented, in sum, with a set of evidence rules of which some
significant number seem to be not only grounded in rationalization, but
unabashedly so. In discussing these rules, the drafters who created them, the
courts that apply them, and the scholars who analyze them question the validity
of the reasons underlying the rules but reaffirm the rules themselves. They
question the logic of the rules while affirming the behavior of applying them.
They set the paradigmatic stage, in other words, for cognitive dissonance.
III. COGNITIVE DISSONANCE AND OTHER UNCOMFORTABLE PSYCHOLOGICAL
STATES
The theory of cognitive dissonance, as noted above, posits that people feel
discomfort when they hold two discrepant cognitions in mind at once. As a
result, they are driven to reconcile these cognitions by somehow bringing them
closer to consonance. A paradigmatic instance of dissonance is presented
when one’s beliefs conflict with one’s behavior or experience.62 And a
paradigmatic response to such conflict, as predicted by dissonance theory, is
rationalization.63 By rationalizing—constructing reasonable justifications that
appear to bring the attitude and experience into consonance—the person
satisfies the psychological drive for coherence and reduces the discomfort of
dissonance.
Humans are exceptionally adept at rationalization.64 Indeed, recent
research suggests that at least some attitude change occurs automatically and
Reveals Shocking Truth About Hearsay, 62 UMKC L. REV. 1, 1 (1993) (revealing several
“truths,” including “Everything is Nonhearsay,” “Everything is Hearsay,” and “Everything Fits
Under an Exception”).
62. For example, a person believes that smoking is harmful and the person smokes. See
Eddie Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills, An Introduction to Cognitive Dissonance Theory and an
Overview of Current Perspectives on the Theory, in PROGRESS ON A PIVOTAL THEORY, supra
note 12, at 4–5.
63. See Lieberman et al., supra note 1, at 135 (using illustration of Aesop’s tale of the fox
and the grapes, in which the fox tries in vain to reach the grapes and when he cannot, says to
himself: “The grapes are sour, and not as ripe as I thought”).
64. The extent of this ability was illuminated in a fascinating series of natural experiments
done by neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga. In the human brain, the left hemisphere controls
movement and receives sensory input from the right side of the body and the right hemisphere
from the left. With a patient whose right and left cerebral hemispheres had been severed,
professor Gazzaniga and his team directed him to do a task with his left hand (while keeping the
left side of the brain in the dark, so to speak, by flashing the direction in the part of the visual
field that only the right hemisphere can see). He then asked the patient why he had done the task
with his left hand. The patient knew he had done the task, yet he did not know why. In response
to the question, he convincingly advanced quite a detailed and plausible explanation that was,
however, completely false. For a more detailed account of this experiment, see STEVEN PINKER,
THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 43 (2002); see also Julie A.
Seaman, Form and (Dys)function in Sexual Harassment Law: Biology, Culture, and the
Spandrels of Title VII, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 321, 342–43 n.42 (2005). Neuroscientist V.S.
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without conscious processing.65 Thus amnesiacs—who have no conscious
memory of the contradictory behavior—exhibit the same degree of attitude
change in free-choice paradigm studies as persons without memory
impairment.66
As illustrated above, the law—and in particular evidence law—is also
exceptionally adept at rationalization. Just like the patient whose right and left
hemispheres have been disconnected, the law sees a behavior (a rule) and
constructs plausible explanations for that behavior (a rationale or
rationalization).67 In this way, it minimizes dissonance. Students (and
professors) of the law are at one remove from such consonance-seeking
stratagems: it is not just their own behaviors and attitudes that appear
inconsistent, but those of the actors in the system they study.68 As they learn
the rules and their rationalizations, the fact of dissonance is, for a time,
presented in stark relief. Because of this, there may exist a unique opportunity
to use the dissonance induced by the rules and their rationalizations to create a
space in which genuine learning can occur. That space—the space between
experience and reason, between rules and their rationales—is elusive.
Dissonance theory predicts (and psychology experiments teach) that people
feel uncomfortable in that space and will work hard to close it.69 To the extent
Ramachandran hypothesizes that the left hemisphere acts as a sort of “general” whose “job is to
create a belief system or model and to fold new experiences into that belief system.” V.S.
RAMACHANDRAN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, PHANTOMS IN THE BRAIN: PROBING THE MYSTERIES
OF THE HUMAN MIND 136 (1998). Though not addressing the theory of cognitive dissonance per
se, he suggests that such dissonance reduction strategies as denial, repression, and rationalization
flow from this function of the left hemisphere. However, “[w]hen the anomalous information
[from the “Devil’s Advocate” in the right hemisphere] reaches a certain threshold, the right
hemisphere decides that it is time to force a complete revision of the entire model.” Id. The left
“always tries to cling tenaciously to the way things were.” Id.
65. As professor Lieberman points out, it is probably misleading to call such processes
“rationalization,” which implies some conscious motivation. See Lieberman et al., supra note 1,
at 139.
66. See id. at 136–38. In addition, Lieberman’s experiments showed that persons under
cognitive load similarly experienced attitude change in response to dissonance, again suggesting
that unconscious (non-rational) processes were at work. See id. at 138–39.
67. Some recent neuroscience research suggests that humans’ pervasive sensation that their
decisions follow from rational thought processes may be in many instances an illusion created by
the brain. Instead, studies show that many decisions are intuitive—they originate in the more
primitive, emotional centers of the brain—and are afterward rationalized by the higher centers of
the brain. See Gazzaniga & Steven, supra note 15, at 87; see, e.g., DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE
ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL (2002).
68. In a larger sense, dissonance may be created in the students themselves insofar as they
arrive in law school with the belief that the law is rational and fair, and this belief is challenged
by their experience with actual cases and with the rationalizations behind the rules.
69. Festinger suggested that “low-importance” attitudes and behaviors are less susceptible to
dissonance-reducing strategies. See Judson Mills, Improving the 1957 Version of Dissonance
Theory, in PROGRESS ON A PIVOTAL THEORY, supra note 12, at 33–35 (discussing FESTINGER,
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that we, as teachers and students of the law, are able to enlarge that space—to
keep our students for a time suspended in the interval between dissonance and
consonance—we may find some small degree of transformative
understanding.70
Furthermore, advances in neuropsychology and related fields teach that
emotion and intuition often play important roles in moral decision-making.
Though difficult or perhaps even impossible to articulate,71 our “gut” feelings
have a significant place in individual decision-making. In thinking about legal
rules, too, these non-rational processes should play some role.72 The benefit of
creating and exploiting cognitive dissonance is that it can highlight the place of
emotion, moral judgment, and experience in formulating and applying the rules
so that the process becomes transparent rather than opaque. In other words, we
should look upon the dissonance created by the rules and their rationalizations
as an ideal teachable moment: By focusing attention on the dissonance, we can
help students to gain insight into the proper role of emotion and moral
judgment in the rules, as well as to better understand the true reasons behind
them.
Psychological studies tend to show that “individuals seem to have a
remarkable capacity for avoiding awareness of inconsistencies unless their
noses are quite vigorously rubbed in them.”73 Cognitive dissonance is
increased when people are reminded of the inconsistent cognitions rather than

supra note 1). In other words, where persons do not care very much about the beliefs in question,
they are less apt to worry about consistency with other beliefs or with behavior. That this
observation might apply to Evidence students is probably a mixed blessing.
70. Cf. THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962) (advancing
the notion of transformative paradigm shifts in science).
71. The evidence rules provide an analogy in FED. R. EVID. 701, the rule expanding the
admissibility of lay opinion testimony.
72. There is, of course, the danger that affirming the place of non-rational components of
decision-making might allow prejudice and bias to infect the process. Indeed, neuroscience
studies confirm that bias and fear reactions originate in the amygdala (the “emotional” brain).
See David H. Zald, The Human Amygdala and the Emotional Evaluation of Sensory Stimuli, 41
BRAIN RESEARCH REV. 88, 106 (2002); Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect
Measures of Race Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 729,
729 (2000). However, surely it is better to recognize the role of intuition, emotion, and
experience rather than to rationalize decisions and rules and thereby pretend that those decisions
and rules are devoid of emotional grounding. The role of emotion in law has recently been the
focus of much scholarship. See, e.g., THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999); Terry
A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, LAW & HUM. BEH.
(forthcoming 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=726864; Dan M. Kahan & Martha C.
Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996).
73. Ian McGregor et al., “Remembering” Dissonance: Simultaneous Accessibility of
Inconsistent Cognitive Elements Moderates Epistemic Discomfort, in PROGRESS ON A PIVOTAL
THEORY, supra note 12, at 325, 331.
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distracted from focusing on them.74 In a study using the “forbidden-toy
paradigm,” for example, children were told that the researcher was going to
leave the room, and that they should not play with a particular (and very
desirable) toy. They were told that if they did play with the toy, the researcher
would be very angry with them and they would be punished.75 The study
demonstrated that the greatest amount of “toy derogation” (the children’s
rationalizing response to the dissonance created by wanting to play with the
toy and not playing with the toy) occurred where the children were reminded
during the experiment of both cognitions.76 On the other hand, when they were
distracted from one or both cognitions, the level of toy derogation was
lessened.77 In what the psychology literature calls a state of “induced
hypocrisy”78—intentioned focus upon the dissonance—individuals are the
most susceptible to learning and attitude change.79
On the other hand, where participants are allowed to focus on the
implementation of the course of action that has already been decided upon,
they tend to experience “hardening of the attitudes.”80 This is consistent with
one of the original findings of cognitive dissonance research: When a person
with a strong belief is challenged by contradictory evidence, he is less likely to
discard the belief than to “show a new fervor about convincing and converting
other people to his view.”81 However, such hardening requires social
support.82 Where the person “is a member of a group of convinced persons
who can support one another, we would expect the belief to be maintained and
the believers to attempt to proselyte or to persuade nonmembers that the belief
is correct.”83 Courts and commentators expounding upon the rules of evidence
might be inclined to cling tightly to their rationalizations; students might be

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See id. at 332–40.
See id. at 333–35 (discussing earlier study done by Aronson & Carlsmith).
See id. at 333–34.
Id.
See Elliot Aronson, Dissonance, Hypocrisy, and the Self-Concept, in PROGRESS ON A
PIVOTAL THEORY, supra note 12, at 103, 113–19.
79. Aronson’s studies involved attitudes of college students toward condom use and their
conflicting behavior in not using condoms though they knew that such behavior was dangerous.
He found that by inducing hypocrisy—bringing home to the students in a very stark way the
conflict between their professed beliefs and their counterattitudinal behaviors—he was able to
induce significant change. See id. at 115–16 (reporting that “[t]hose participants who were in the
high-dissonance (hypocrisy) condition showed the greatest intention to increase their use of
condoms. . . . 2 months later, there was a tendency for the participants in the high-dissonance cell
to report using condoms a higher percentage of the time than in any of the other three cells”).
80. See McGregor et al., supra note 73, at 342.
81. LEON FESTINGER ET AL., WHEN PROPHESY FAILS: A SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
STUDY OF A MODERN GROUP THAT PREDICTED THE DESTRUCTION OF THE WORLD 3 (1956).
82. See id. at 4.
83. Id.
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inclined not only to accept them but to insist that they are valid. If one needs
social support to retain an unsupportable belief, it follows that one needs even
more support to abandon it. Professors, by highlighting dissonance and
rationalization, can provide such support.
In addition, if the pedagogic goal is to increase dissonance and thereby to
increase learning, it is important that students not only feel the psychological
discomfort created by the inconsistencies, but also that they correctly attribute
that discomfort to the conflict between the rule and the rationalization.
Misattribution decreases the degree of attitude change that ultimately results
from the dissonance. In one study, some participants were given a placebo and
told that the pill would make them feel anxious. Those subjects experienced
little attitude change, presumably because they were able to attribute their
feelings of discomfort to the pill rather than to the dissonance between their
behavior and their existing attitudes.84 To the extent that students are inclined
to attribute their uneasy feelings to sources other than the inconsistency
between the rule and the rationale,85 such misattribution should be
discouraged.
Finally, there are a few other dissonance-reduction red flags against which
professors should be on guard. One method individuals use to escape feelings
of dissonance is trivialization. Any suggestion that either the contradictory
belief or behavior is not really very important and that the individual should
not worry about it is likely to “give [those] participants permission to forget
about [the] inconsistent behavior.”86 If, in the classroom, the professor is
tempted to notice that a rationale does not quite support a rule, but to then tell
students in essence just to learn the rule and rationale without concerning
themselves about the inconsistency, a learning opportunity will be lost because
dissonance will be overcome.
IV. CONCLUSION: IN PRAISE OF INDUCED HYPOCRISY
Benjamin Franklin famously remarked: “So convenient a thing it is to be a
reasonable creature, since it enables one to find or make a reason for
everything one has a mind to do.”87 In this Essay, I have attempted to advance
a much less cynical account of the process of reason and even of
rationalization. Indeed, I have come to praise hypocrisy in the law and to
suggest that it be dug up and closely examined.
84. See Patricia G. Devine et al., Moving Beyond Attitude Change in the Study of
Dissonance-Related Processes, in PROGRESS ON A PIVOTAL THEORY, supra note 12, at 297, 301–
02.
85. For example, by believing that their discomfort stems from the difficulty of the subject
matter or from the fact that the professor is boring.
86. McGregor et al., supra note 73, at 340.
87. See BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 31 (Peter
Conn ed., University of Pennsylvania Press 2005) (1791).
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We tend to think of the law as the epitome of rational, linear thought.
Intuitive thought processes, on the other hand, are more amorphous. Evidence
law, because it operates in the place where reason and experience meet,
exposes the cracks in the logical framework and allows intuition to seep
through. Just as cognitive neuropsychology has begun to reveal the important
role of emotion and intuition in human decision-making, evidence law reveals
the role of such impulses in legal decision-making. In the Evidence class,
students can learn to use the emotional brain of the law. To do so, however,
they must be encouraged to attend to the dissonance created by the conflict
between the rules and their rationalizations and to remain for a brief time
suspended in the place between dissonance and consonance.
Dissonance is the place of change, of paradigm shift, of learning.
Individuals, however, seek consonance. Students seek black letter answers to
legal questions; teachers, courts, and scholars seek rational explanations for
legal rules. An insistence that students focus on the inconsistencies in the
rules, their rationales, and their application highlights the dissonance in the law
and thereby creates a state of cognitive dissonance in the classroom. By doing
this, teachers may be able to help students gain a deeper, more transformative
understanding of the law. But in order for that to occur, both teachers and
students must be willing to exist, for a time, in “the gap between consonance
and dissonance, where new theories take shape, new beliefs are about to be
born.”88

88. LAUREN SLATER, OPENING SKINNER’S BOX: GREAT PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERIMENTS OF
CENTURY 132 (2004).
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